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Environmental factors add complexity to the comparison between speci￿c activities
or entire entities. Decision making units with an inferior performance are tempted to
invoke that their organization is ￿ di⁄erent￿from the others in the data set. By reinter-
preting and extending the metafrontier literature, we propose an all-embracing concept
to fully capture the operational environment. We suggest the ￿ Group Speci￿c Technical
E¢ ciency￿as a new measure to assess the overall e¢ ciency of a utility while allowing
for environmental di⁄erences. A real-world example of drinking water utilies out of 5
di⁄erent countries illustrates the concept.
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1 Introduction
The performance comparison of an entity with a reference entity has been widely applied
for both managerial and academic purposes. There are several examples in di⁄erent ￿elds,
such as health, utilities (water, waste, energy, etc.), defence, education, justice, either in
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1the public administration or in the private sector. When comparing only two activities or
entities, it is relatively easy to pin-point the exact environmental factor which causes the
inferior performance. When comparing a bundle of activities or entire organizations, it is
more intricate to identify the precise factors causing the poor e¢ ciency. It is thus easier for
managers to argue that, due to environmental factors, their organization is ￿ di⁄erent￿from
the other entities in the data set. Although these concerns are a drawback highlighted by
the benchmarking literature, frequently a benchmarking initiative is the only incentive to
trigger e¢ ciency and innovation in a natural monopolistic sector as competition in or for the
market is impractical or not desirable.
In this article we concentrate on the measurement of e¢ ciency (i.e. to which extent
resources are converted into products) by the use of deterministic frontier models. Method-
ologies such as the non-parametric Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Free Disposal
Hull (FDH) are popular among scholars and practitioners. However, despite the fact that
hundreds of papers apply these methodologies, only a few of them try to take into account the
operational environment, most of them simply neglect the exogenous in￿ uences. Neverthe-
less, exogenous environmental factors could in￿ uence the e¢ ciency scores to a large extent.
Indeed, favorable environmental variables behave as a substitutive input, while unfavorable
factors absorb inputs to compensate the disadvantageous conditions.
The literature suggests various methodologies to integrate the operational environment
(i.e., the heterogeneity) into the DEA analysis, however, none of them is consensual. Fol-
lowing Fried et al. (1999), the methodologies can be divided into several groups. Firstly,
the frontier separation approach divides the observations in groups according to the envi-
ronmental characteristics. Secondly, the all-in-one approach takes the exogenous variables
immediately as an additional input (if a favorable e⁄ect) or as an additional output (if an
unfavorable e⁄ect). Thirdly, the frequently employed two-stage model employs a truncated
Tobit regression to estimate the direction of the in￿ uence of the environmental e⁄ect. How-
ever, Simar and Wilson (2007) show some serious doubts with respect to the Tobit estimates.
Fourthly, the multi-stage models take into account slacks. Each of these techniques has its
own advantages and drawbacks which causes (small) changes in the results. However, an
important common disadvantage of these approaches is the necessity to speci￿y a priori the
exogenous in￿ uences. In addition, none of these methodologies is successful in fully captur-
ing the operational environment. Evaluated entities could easily invoke other (also implicit)
exogenous factors in addition to the a priori speci￿ed environmental variables. In many em-
pirical evaluations, the e¢ ciency of the DMUs could be largely in￿ uenced by ￿ untouchable￿
variables (e.g. corporate atmosphere) which are di¢ cult to capture in numerical data, or
by in￿ uences which are on its own of a minor importance (e.g. weather conditions) but in
interaction with other variables have a signi￿cant impact on the observation￿ s e¢ ciency (e.g.
social and cultural aspects).
Reinterpreting and extending the work of Battese and Rao (2002), Battese et al. (2004)
2and O￿ Donnell et al. (2007), we develop a methodology which fully tries to capture the het-
erogeneity by the use of a ￿ Metafrontier￿ -framework. The latter concept, ￿rstly, evaluates each
observation relatively to the own group best practice frontier (where the units of the group
are assumed to have the same environmental characteristics) and, secondly, to the overall-
metafrontier constituting from the best practices of the di⁄erent groups. The comparison of
these two e¢ ciency scores delivers the ￿ Group Speci￿c Technical E¢ ciency￿(GTE) which
measures the overall e¢ ciency of an entity while fully incorporating the explicit and implicit
environmental characteristics. Therefore, the developed metafrontier framework is relatively
easy to handle for practitioners, well explainable to stakeholders and straightforward to adapt
to di⁄erent models and situations.
We adapt the metafrontier framework to the robust order-m e¢ ciencies as developed
by Cazals et al. (2002). In the second section of the paper, we show by simulation that
the robust e¢ ciency scores could solve the current problem in the metafrontier literature of
di⁄erent group sizes. Indeed, as Zhang and Bartels (1998) point out, when comparing the
average e¢ ciencies of samples with di⁄erent size, the results will be biased.
Finally, we apply the theory to an international data set of 122 utilities from 5 countries.
Corrected for the heterogeneity, we ￿nd that the benchmarked Dutch utilities, the English
and Welsh utilities regulated by yardstick competition and the regulated Australian utilities
are performing better than the Belgian and Portuguese drinking water companies.
The research is organised as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the measurement of e¢ ciency
by the use of deterministic and robust frontier models. Section 3 develops the metafrontier
concept to incorporate the operational environment. In Section 4, the model is applied to
the drinking water sector. Section 5 concludes the article.
2 Frontier models
2.1 Deterministic frontier models
Decision Making Units (DMUs) transform multiple inputs into heterogenous outputs with
a varying success. Conditional on the technology, each of the n ￿rms absorb p inputs x to
create q outputs y. The set of all these ￿rms, called technology set, is characterized by
￿ = f(x;y) 2 R
p+q
+ j x can produce yg: (1)
One way to estimate the relative e¢ ciency of a DMU is to assume that the best performing
units constitute a frontier which represents the best in class technology. The boundary of
the technology set ￿ is represented by
￿￿ = f(x;y) 2 ￿ j (￿x;y) 62 ￿;80 < ￿ < 1;(x;￿y) 62 ￿;8￿ > 1g: (2)
Viz-a-viz the ￿rms along the production frontier, DMUs which are using relatively more
resources to produce the given outputs in an input-oriented model, or DMUs which are
3producing relatively less outputs given their used inputs in an output-oriented model are
considered as relatively ine¢ cient. These ￿rms are operating in the interior of the frontier
￿. For a DMU located at (x;y) 2 R
p+q
+ one can measure the input and output e¢ ciency as,
respectively,
￿(x;y) = inff￿ j (￿x;y) 2 ￿g; (3)
￿(x;y) = supf￿ j (x;￿y) 2 ￿g: (4)
A procedure to measure the relative ine¢ ciency scores ￿ and ￿ is to apply non-parametric
techniques such as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) or parametric techniques as Stochastic
Frontier Analysis (SFA). In this article, we concentrate on a less restrictive non-parametric
estimator than DEA, i.e. the Free Disposal Hull (FDH) estimator of Deprins et al. (1984).
Both DEA and FDH estimate the technology set ￿ by the smallest set ^ ￿ that envelops the
observed data. But whereas DEA uses constant (CRS) or variable returns to scale (VRS),
respectively, the convex cone or convex hull of the FDH estimator, FDH relies only on a free
disposability assumption (i.e. if (x;y) 2 ￿, then for any (x0;y0) such that x0 ￿ x and y0 ￿ y,
(x0;y0) 2 ￿). The DEA convexity assumption is not always valid as there may be returns to
scale or non-divisible inputs and outputs. The FDH estimator is given by
^ ￿FDH = f(x;y) 2 R
p+q
+ j y ￿ yi;x ￿ xi;i = 1;:::;ng: (5)
The e¢ ciency scores ^ ￿FDH can be measured relatively to this frontier via











Alternatively, the input-oriented FDH e¢ ciency scores can be obtained by solving the mixed
integer linear programming problem









￿i = 1;￿i 2 f0;1g;i = 1;:::;ng: (7)
2.2 Robust frontier models
Another, less deterministic, procedure are the robust order-m e¢ ciencies as suggested by
Cazals et al. (2002). This non-parametric estimator of the technology set ￿ is related to the
FDH estimator but instead of constructing a full frontier as FDH does, it creates a partial
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4where the p-dimensional random variables x1;:::;xm are drawn randomly and repeatedly
from the conditional distribution of X given yi ￿ y. The estimator is based on the ￿ expected
minimum input function￿which allows to compare the e¢ ciency of an observation with that
of m potential units that have a production larger or equal to y. As it does not include all
observations, it is less sensitive to outliers, extreme values or noise in the data. Although
the estimator converges to the FDH estimate when m increases, this is only an asymptotic
result.
Correcting for sample size by order-m e¢ ciencies
As Zhang and Bartels (1998) indicate, a dissimilarity in sample sizes makes the comparison
of average e¢ ciency scores impossible. To solve this problem, we propose to use the order-m
e¢ ciencies of Cazals et al. (2002) in the spirit of the bootstrap ideas of Zhang and Bartels
(1998). The latter suggest to focus on the group with the largest data set (n1 > n2) and after
drawing n2 random ￿rms without replacement from the largest group￿ s sample, to carry out
an e¢ ciency measurement (e.g. by FDH) to ￿nd the e¢ ciency for these n2 ￿rms. To make
a valid comparison between the mean e¢ ciencies of group 1 and 2, this has to be replicated
a number of times (bootstrapping). Indeed, the idea of the partial frontier in the order-m
approach, as introduced above, is similar to this bootstrapping procedures. In contrast to
Zhang and Bartels (1998), we set m equal to the smallest data set as this ￿ts better in the
metafrontier framework (see infra).
To show the merits of this approach, we simulate a data set and compute for di⁄erent
sample sizes the input-oriented FDH and the order-m e¢ ciencies. We create 100 observations
which use one input to produce two outputs. Both input and outputs are created from
random numbers between 0 and 1: x = rand1 ￿ 15, y1 = rand2 ￿ rand3 ￿ 10, y2 = 6:5 ￿
(rand1 ￿ rand2)=rand3. There is no signi￿cant correlation between the three variables. The
estimation results, as presented in Table 1, reveal the decrease in average FDH-e¢ ciency.
The decline in terms of percentage relatively to the average FDH-e¢ ciency estimates of a
sample of 10 observations is drawn in Figure 1. As a striking contrast, the average order-m
e¢ ciencies (with m = 10 and B = 100) initially decline, but from a sample size of 50 on,
they remain more or less constant on values above one which shows the decreased in￿ uence
of outlying observations. Remark that both the ranks of the observations and the values of
the e¢ ciency scores are highly correlated for di⁄erent values of m (a correlation of 0.95). The
main advantage of a lower trimming value m is the reduced sensibility to outlying observations
in the sample.
2.3 Taking into account the operational environment
The ability of e¢ ciently transforming the resources into products does not only depend on the
technical e¢ ciency of the DMUs but also on the operational environment that characterizes
5Table 1: Di⁄erence between average FDH e¢ ciencies and order-m e¢ ciencies
FDH order-m (B=100)
m = 10 Average Average Average
e¢ ciency e¢ ciency st. deviation
n = 10 0.8523 0.9499 0.0179
n = 20 0.8146 0.8886 0.0131
n = 30 0.6969 0.8668 0.0294
n = 40 0.6592 0.8479 0.0353
n = 50 0.6897 1.0538 0.0531
n = 60 0.6323 1.0358 0.0573
n = 70 0.6409 1.0255 0.0515
n = 80 0.6353 1.0871 0.0518
n = 90 0.6300 1.0286 0.0465
n = 100 0.6337 1.0609 0.0473
Figure 1: Di⁄erence between FDH and order-m
6them. Therefore, the results of the benchmarking frontier models have a limited value if the
operational environment where the DMUs perform is not taken into account (see Daraio and
Simar, 2007; Fried et al., 1999].
For example, for the water utilities it is argued that the ownership has an impact on the
DMU e¢ ciency. Other factors are the consumers￿density, the percentage of non-domestic
volume required or the water quality at its source. Hence, if the environmental variables
are not adequately taken into account, some DMUs can be considered as e¢ cient when they
are ine¢ cient or vice-versa, which is misleading. The operational environment, de￿ned here,
comprises all the explanatory factors that interfere, to a larger or lesser extent, with the
DMU performance. There is not a precise de￿nition of explanatory factors in the literature.
They can be contextual or not. The environment (annual rainfall and topography) are con-
text factors but the level of outsourcing is not, although the managers can only in￿ uence the
latter factor in the long-term. However, these explanatory factors should not be confounded
with non-discretionary (or non-controllable) inputs or outputs that are part of the productive
process. To illustrate this in a water utilities context, the input mains length, representative
of the input capital, is not controllable, at least in the short run, by the DMUs, so it cannot
be classi￿ed as discretionary (controllable), even though it remains an input. From a dif-
ferent perspective, the peak factor is clearly an exogenous factor, in spite of having a great
importance in the productive e¢ ciency.
The classi￿cation of the variables into inputs, outputs and explanatory factors is somewhat
complex, but fundamental in non-parametric studies. Lovell (2003) suggests that all the non-
discretionary variables (non-controllable) should be considered in a second stage. This issue
is discussed later. Unhappily in the water sector few studies try to encompass the in￿ uence of
the explanatory factors in e¢ ciency. Byrnes (1985), Woodbury and Dollery (2004), Resende
and Tupper (2004) and De Witte and Marques (2007) are some of the exceptions.
However, in the comparison of entities, it is intricate and sometimes (almost) impossible
to identify and measure the environmental factors which create the heterogeneity among
the entities. In a similar benchmarking process, observations can easily claim that they are
totally di⁄erent and do not ￿t in the benchmark. Therefore, in the next section, we develop
a framework which tries to fully compare the entities of several groups without the a priori
selection and determination of exogenous characteristics.
3 A Metafrontier Approach
3.1 Metafrontiers
By reinterpreting and extending the ideas of Battese and Rao (2002), Battese et al. (2004)
O￿ Donnell et al. (2007), we develop an attempt to fully (with explicit and implicit determined
environmental variables) take into account the operational environment by the use of what
7they call ￿ Metafrontiers￿ . Although not explicitly referred to, the idea of metafrontiers is used
in other studies as well, see e.g. Morita (2003) and Portela and Thanassoulis (2001). In this
section we analyze and enrich the literature on metafrontiers.
In a world with K groups, each having their speci￿c state of technology and environmental
factors, a metafrontier is de￿ned as the boundary of the unrestricted technology set. Hence,
the metafrontier envelops each of the separate group frontiers. For each of the K groups, the
production process is constrained by the state of technology which transforms for each of the
nk observations in group k the p inputs xk into q outputs yk (for k = 1;:::;K). The group




kxk;yk) 2 ￿kg (9)
where the technology set ￿k for group k is de￿ned as
￿k = f(xk;yk) 2 R
p+q
+ j xk can produce ykg: (10)
If technology is freely interchangeable and thus if the k di⁄erent groups have potential ac-
cess to the same technology, we can apply the previously explained group frontier analysis
relatively to the metafrontier. By pooling the observations of the K subgroups, the DMUs
are evaluated with respect to the same standards. In this sense, the metafrontier represents
an over-arching metatechnology where the technology set is de￿ned by
￿ = f(x;y) 2 R
p+q
+ j x can produce yg (11)
where x and y denote, respectively, the input and output vector of an observation of any of
the k groups. The (pooled) sample size is the main di⁄erence between the meta-concept and
the group-concepts.
We present a graphical analysis of metafrontiers for the input-oriented FDH framework
(an extension to the output-oriented framework is trivial). A simple example in the case of
a single input and output technology is illustrated in Figure 2. Z represents two coinciding
DMUs, Z1 and Z3, respectively of group 1 and group 3. As group frontier 1 envelops group
frontier 3 in this particular interval, the best performing utilities in group 1 are able to
produce the same amount of outputs with less inputs than the best performing observations
of group 3. Therefore, utilities of group 1 are part of the metafrontier. This superiority of
group 1 on the other groups could be attributed to a more advanced technology or to more
favorable environmental factors, out of control of the ￿rm￿ s managers. Measured relatively
to the group frontier, an ine¢ cient observation Z3 performs relatively more e¢ ciently than
an ine¢ cient observation Z1:










8Figure 2: Graphical analysis of metafrontiers
This implies that using the technology available in group 1, the output vector of Z can be
produced by using only 30 per cent of the input vector, while using the technology of group
3, only 60 per cent of the inputs would be necessary in comparison to the best practices.
The e¢ ciency measured relatively to the metafrontier, TE￿, is the same for both DMUs
(i.e. TE￿ equals 0.30). As an interesting exercise, we could compare the meta and the group
technology. A ￿rst concept to measure this gap is the technology gap ratio (TGR) introduced
by Battese and Rao (2002). It reveals, in terms of percentage (1-TGR), the gap between
the maximum input reduction possible under the group technology and the metatechnology.




























3.2 Group Speci￿c Technical E¢ ciency
The TGR only indicates the potential input reduction of copying the best practice (meta)
technology. In this subsection, we introduce a composite statistic which is complementary to
the TGR and which tries to rank the observations while fully taking into account the opera-
tional environment. Relying on two assumptions, the developed indicator uses the e¢ ciency
estimates relatively both to the metafrontier and to the group frontier. Firstly, we assume,
and test in the next subsection, that DMUs of the same group face homogenous environmen-
tal factors. This is a reasonable assumption as the assignment of observations to a particular
9group is mostly clear-cut and thus the operational environment within a group will be well
comparable (e.g. utilities from the same region, sector or company). Secondly, we assume
that, although the DMUs of di⁄erent groups could be exposed to di⁄erent environmental
factors, the pooled observations perform relatively to the metafrontier as e¢ cient as they are
doing relatively to their group frontier. Hence, on the one hand, DMUs which are a bench-
mark in the group sample will not additionally be penalized in their e¢ ciency relatively to
the metafrontier. On the other hand, DMUs that are already ine¢ cient in the homogeneous
group sample, will be additionally penalized in their ine¢ ciency in the meta sample. The
newly obtained variable, which we label group speci￿c technical e¢ ciency (GTE￿), computes
the degree of ine¢ ciency if the group ine¢ ciency were unchanged and if the utilities faced





If we compare in our graphical example DMUs of group 1 with observations of group 3,
the former could have both a superior technology and more favorable environmental factors.
Since favorable environmental factors behave as substitutive inputs, DMUs of group 1 need
relatively less resources to produce the same proportion of outputs, which yields higher
e¢ ciency scores. Utilities of group 3 in comparison to utilities of group 1, besides having an
inferior technology, could face more unfavorable environmental factors. As these behave as
substitutive outputs, they absorb resources, causing lower e¢ ciency estimates. Following our
￿rst assumption, we assume that regarding to the group frontier all DMUs of group k are
working in the same environment and with the same technology. Hence, observation Z1 is
relatively to the other observations in its group very ine¢ cient (0.3), which contrasts to Z3
that is relatively to the other DMUs in the group only ￿ somewhat￿ine¢ cient (0.6). Relative
to the metafrontier, all DMUs in group 3 have a low e¢ ciency score due to the unfavorable
environmental factors.
On the one hand, the group frontier analysis can not be used to detect di⁄erences in
e¢ ciency between the groups since each group has its own benchmarks. On the other hand,
although a metafrontier analysis is able to detect the group di⁄erences, it pools all the
observations but does not take into account di⁄erences in environmental factors. The GTE￿
￿lls this gap by computing e¢ ciency estimates relatively to the pooled sample and by taking
into account the operational environment. Assuming in the graphical example that Z1 and
Z3 transform their resources with the same extent of ine¢ ciency in the meta approach as in




1 = 0:3 ￿ 0:3 = 0:09 GTE￿
3 = TE￿
3 ￿ TEk
3 = 0:3 ￿ 0:6 = 0:18
























We could interpret the GTE￿ as we would give every DMU the bene￿t of the doubt (i.e.
e¢ ciency score of 1), but penalize for its ine¢ ciency relatively to the group frontier (BZ
OZ)
and to the metafrontier (AZ
OZ) while correcting for the interaction between the group and the
meta-e¢ ciency (AZ:BZ
OZ2 ).
Up to now, the metafrontier literature has been using both parametric and non-parametric
estimators, in particular DEA and SFA, to estimate the relative e¢ ciency of an observation.
However, this can easily be extended to other models as well. In this paper, we concentrate
on a speci￿c non-parametric estimation technique to estimate the group e¢ ciencies since the
use of DEA to compare several groups with di⁄erent group sizes could create biased results
(see supra). By our best knowledge, this particular issue is still neglected in the metafrontier
literature. Many authors are using DEA to compare group frontiers with a di⁄erent number
of observations. Hence, it is impossible to compare the obtained results correctly as the
relative e¢ ciency score of the DMUs depends on the number of observations in the group
sample. Also FDH faces this drawback. By the use of order-m frontiers, we propose an
alternative approach.
4 Metafrontiers to the drinking water sector
4.1 Data and model speci￿cation
Due to sunk capital costs in the mains and in production plants, the drinking water sector
can be labeled as a natural monopolistic network industry. The ￿xed and largely sunk costs
for water distribution represent up to 70 per cent of the total drinking water price (compare
to the 40 per cent in the energy sector). Transportation di¢ culties further reinforce the
natural monopoly as a transport over 100 kilometers increases the wholesale cost of water
by about 50 percent (compared to 5% for electricity and 2.5% for gas). Another inhibitor of
competition in the water sector is the percentage of consumption of the di⁄erent consumers,
which is more penalizing for the water sector than in other network industries. Industrial
consumers, for example, guarantee 50% of the revenue of the electricity sector where only
13% of the water sector. Besides, the water sector depends mainly on domestic consumers
(75%), compared with the 30% for the electricity sector. Among others, these facts show
that a liberalization of the water sector would unlikely result in the same bene￿ts as in other
network industries. However, as a natural monopoly creates X-ine¢ ciencies, quiet life and
excess pro￿ts, governments should establish regulatory bodies to promote e¢ ciency (doing
the things right) and e⁄ectiveness (doing the right things) in the drinking water sector. This
section attempts to perform a benchmark study by comparing 5 countries by the metafrontier
approach.
We consider in our research the water utilities from England and Wales, Australia, the
11Netherlands, Belgium and Portugal. In 1989 England and Wales water utilities were priva-
tised, which was the major landmark that has occurred in water sector worldwide until now.
This bold reform makes the State watchdog role more important and visible and, maybe for
this reason, the best value of the water sector has been its regulation which, by means of a
price cap regulatory method and by the use and abuse of benchmarking, has formed a virtual
market in the water sector in these countries. Water services are vertically integrated and
some of them provide wastewater along with water. In the Netherlands the water services
are provided by public limited companies separately from other activities and are vertically
integrated. The main features of the sector are, besides its corporatization, the merging that
took place in the last decades reducing the two hundred operators that existed in the 1960s
to the current ten and the self-regulation of the sector by the Association of Dutch Water
Utilities (Vewin). This particular kind of ￿ regulator￿has improved the performance of the
sector, avoiding its privatisation by the application of a voluntary balanced scorecard bench-
marking scheme among its members. Water utilities in Australia are similar to the Dutch in
their governance. They are almost always public and are also corporatized, working under
commercial principles. However, in Australia there is strict regulation. The competency of
the water services belong to the States /Territories and a Federal Law obliges all monop-
olies, irrespective of the ownership, to be regulated by independent regulatory authorities.
Water utilities often provide other services like wastewater, gas or waste. In Belgium the
water sector institutional framework changes with the region. Unlike the Walloon region,
where regulation recently exists, the water services provided by the municipalities or their
associations are absent of regulation. There are a large number of players, although some of
them with large size. Most of the water utilities work under a non-commercial principle. The
rule is the separation of the activities (water and wastewater) and sometimes the production
from the distribution. There are no incentive schemes in the Belgian water sector and only
recently has the benchmarking tool started to be applied in the Walloon region. In Portugal
the responsibility for the water services belongs to the municipalities. There are about 300
players where approximately 10 % are private concessions. The private water utilities are cur-
rently regulated by the Institute for the Regulation of Water and Waste (IRAR) with quality
service supervision functions very relevant. The remaining utilities work in a deregulated
environment and the majority in a non-commercial way. Water services are usually provided
together with other activities like wastewater and they went through the unbundling process
some years ago with separated entities for the production and the distribution.
The data set is obtained from the sector organizations O¢ ce of Water Services (OFWAT,
England and Wales), Association of Dutch Water Utilities (VEWIN, Netherlands), Water
Services Association of Australia (WSAA, Australia), Belgaqua (Belgium) and Portuguese
Water Association (APDA, Portugal). All data originate from 2005, except for Belgium
(2004). The model speci￿cation is the most important step in any e¢ ciency analysis as it
heavily in￿ uences the results. We opted, following the literature, for a simple model inspired
12Table 2: Homogeneity assumption of countries
leakage (%) industrial water (%) groundwater (%) consumption/capita regional product
Intercept 0.309 (***) 0.214 (***) 30.370 (***) 134.229 15687.440 (***)
Netherlands -0.269 (***) 0.161 (***) 63.880 (***) 16.668 8784.003 (***)
England and Wales -0.126 (***) 0.049 (*) 18.915 (*) 1308.377 (**) 5948.606 (***)
Australia -0.190 (***) 0.073 (**) 35.339 (***) 229.670 10037.420 (***)
Belgium -0.051 (**) -0.046 (**) 33.492 (***) 13.221 5216.158 (***)
R
2 0.596 0.237 0.232 0.059 0.623
F-statistic 37.576 (***) 7.937 (***) 7.690 (***) 1.602 42.144 (***)
Note: n=107; *** denotes signi￿cance at 1% level, ** at 5% and * at 10%
on a production function. Drinking water utilities need capital, proxied by the length of
mains, and labor, estimated by the number of personnel in full time equivalents, to produce
the outputs which are the delivery of drinking water to a number of connections.
Among the di⁄erent countries, environmental factors such as the geographic features,
relative wealth of the consumers, quality of the ground and surface water or age of the
infrastructure have a signi￿cant in￿ uence on the relative e¢ ciency of the drinking water
utilities. By the use of OLS, we test whether utilities located in the same country face
more or less the same environmental factors. This corresponds to the ￿rst assumption of
the previous section in which we argue that utilities of the same group face homogenous
environmental factors. The results relative to the Portuguese utilities are presented in Table
2. It reveals that environmental variables are mainly country speci￿c as for each of the
environmental variables (except for consumption per capita) we can attribute a signi￿cant
part of the variation in the variable to country dummies. Remark further that we are able
to explain to a large extent (up to 62%) the variation in the environmental variables by
only including country dummies. This strengthens our assumptions that utilities measured
relatively to the group frontier are working in more or less the same environment. This makes
sense as the di⁄erences in social, physical and institutional environment are minor within one
country or region.
4.2 Group and metafrontiers
As argued before, the order-m approach is especially useful in the comparison of average
e¢ ciency scores of groups with di⁄erent sample sizes. In the spirit of Zhang and Bartels (1998)
we set the trimming value m equal to 12, the smallest group size (i.e. for the Netherlands).
While assuming similar environmental factors for utilities working in the same country, we
present the average e¢ ciencies and the standard deviation of the estimates in Table 3. As
the maximum e¢ ciency score reveals, some countries have super-e¢ cient observations. For
example, consider the Dutch utility with an e¢ ciency score of 1.251 indicating that with
a proportionate reduction of the inputs, this DMU uses 25% less inputs than the expected
13minimum input level of 12 other Dutch ￿rms drawn from the population and producing more
than this DMU￿ s output.
By merging the 5 group samples, we measure the meta-e¢ ciency of the utilities. Again
we employ the input-oriented order-m approach as it constructs the partial frontier only with
observations with an equal or larger output vector. Sample size issues are avoided by keeping
the trimming value m equal to 12, such that the metafrontier will be similar to the group
frontier (however, remark that other observations will constitute the partial frontier and
that in the strict sense the dissimilarity in sample size is not an issue in the measurement of
e¢ ciency relatively to the metafrontier). We equilibrate the increased number of observations
in the data set (i.e. 104 instead of e.g. 22) by increasing ￿vefold the number of Monte-Carlo
replications used in computing the order-m estimates (i.e. B = 500). As expected, the results
in Table 3 show a lower average e¢ ciency in all countries, which can intuitively be explained
by the increased possibility of facing a more e¢ cient observation in an enlarged data set. It
should be noticed that the order-m e¢ ciency scores of the metafrontier are not necessarily
smaller than order-m e¢ ciency scores of the group frontier due to the constraint Y ￿ yo.
The comparison of the e¢ ciency measures relatively to the group and metafrontier shows
up in the TGR which is computed for every DMU. The country averages, shown in Table 4,
reveal that on average the DMUs are working on 82% of the best-practice technology available
in one of the 5 countries. Especially the English and Welsh utilities are working closely to the
metafrontier, while the di⁄erence between the group technology and the metatechnology is
with 25.5% the largest for Portugal. It is interesting to note that in all countries, except for
Portugal, the group frontiers are tangent to the metafrontier (as the TGR is equal or larger
to one in each of these four regions) and thus some observations of these countries constitute
the metafrontier.
In the complementary GTE￿ exercise, we ￿rstly assume that utilities relatively to the
group frontier face similar environmental factors, and secondly, that relatively to the metafron-
tier, while using a di⁄erent technology, the utilities work as e¢ cient as they are doing rela-
tively to the group frontiers. These two assumptions result in the GTE￿-ratio and allow us
to rank the utilities while fully taking into account the environmental variables. Frequency
distributions for the TGR and the GTE￿ are presented in Figure 3. As shown in Table 4 the
English and Welsh drinking water companies are performing most e¢ ciently, followed by the
Dutch and Australian utilities. In contrast to Portugal and Belgium these three countries
apply regulatory schemes to stimulate the drinking water sector to produce more e¢ ciently,
so it could be expected that regulatory incentives e⁄ectively increase the e¢ ciency of the sec-
tor. However, it is worthwhile to further investigate this issue. In addition, it is important to
highlight that the inferior performances showed by the Portuguese and Belgian utilities are
not controlled, or at least only partially controlled, by the utilities themselves and therefore
their managers are not responsible for the scores presented. On the other hand, the results
depict the usefulness of the metafrontier concept, since it constitutes a good base to take
14Figure 3: Frequency distributions of TGR and GTE
Table 3: E¢ ciency relatively to the group and metafrontier
Relatively to the group frontier to the metafrontier
Average Standard Maximum Minimum Average Standard
e¢ ciency deviation e¢ ciency deviation
Netherlands 0.980 0.098 1.251 0.864 0.811 0.144
England and Wales 0.943 0.151 1.234 0.657 0.908 0.200
Australia 0.948 0.078 1.090 0.772 0.806 0.135
Belgium 0.931 0.071 1.000 0.797 0.736 0.281
Portugal 0.922 0.172 1.400 0.526 0.686 0.152
Portugal - public 0.990 0.166 1.400 0.713 0.714 0.167
Portugal - private 0.934 0.064 0.973 0.526 0.630 0.098
decisions by the autorities. For example, in this case, the Portuguese and Belgian politicians
can look closely at England and Wales, the Netherlands and Australia and mimic or ￿nd
help in their regulatory framework to take their own decisions.
5 Conclusion
This paper reinterpreted and extended the metafrontier-concept to a framework to account
for exogenous environmental characteristics. By comparing the group frontier and the overall
Table 4: TGR and GTE
Technology Gap Ratio Group Speci￿c Technical E¢ ciency
Average Standard Maximum Minimum Average Standard Maximum Minimum
e¢ ciency deviation e¢ ciency deviation
Netherlands 0.827 0.114 1.011 0.623 0.804 0.220 1.393 0.492
England and Wales 0.957 0.111 1.275 0.716 0.882 0.319 1.619 0.332
Australia 0.847 0.103 1.015 0.693 0.772 0.176 0.983 0.478
Belgium 0.778 0.251 1.339 0.481 0.700 0.308 1.339 0.305
Portugal 0.745 0.088 0.956 0.461 0.653 0.258 1.370 0.211
Portugal - public 0.736 0.104 0.956 0.461 0.714 0.282 1.370 0.365
Portugal - private 0.763 0.042 0.856 0.698 0.531 0.147 0.682 0.211
15metafrontier formed by the best practices of the several groups, the environement corrected
e¢ ciency of entities can be computed and explained easily. In addition, the approach is ap-
plicable to several models, including the robust order-m approach for which, by a simulated
example, we show that it disregards the sample size bias. To judge on the relative e¢ ciency
of the DMUs while fully considering the environmental factors, the ￿ Group Speci￿c Techni-
cal E¢ ciency￿measure is proposed and applied to drinking water utilities from 5 di⁄erent
countries. This research indicated that some of the delay detected in Portugal and Belgium
is derived from a technological gap relatively to other countries, mainly England and Wales.
On the one hand, these results justify the poor performance in this sector in these countries
that is not only responsibility of the managers and, on the other hand, they clearly indicate
the way they have to follow with regard to the water sector governance. It allows for the
conclusion that the use of incentive schemes like regulation and benchmarking is convenient.
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